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Abstract 
 
We combine Duverger’s Law (1954) with Demsetz’s (1968) theory of natural monopoly to 
provide a novel perspective on electoral competitiveness in a single member district, plurality 
rule system. In the framework we develop, competitiveness depends on the contestability of 
elections, which declines as party fragmentation exceeds the long run level predicted by 
Duverger’s Law. We provide support for this Duverger-Demsetz perspective by studying the 
relationship between the concentration of vote shares and a new index of electoral contestability 
over the history of the Canadian parliamentary system from 1867. Extension of the argument to 
proportional electoral systems is also considered. 
JEL-codes: D700, D400. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we combine consideration of Duverger's Law (1954) with Demsetz's (1968) theory of 
natural monopoly to provide a novel perspective on the measurement of electoral competitiveness in a 
single member district, plurality rule electoral system. In the Duverger-Demsetz view, as we shall refer 
to it, an increase in the effective number of parties, measured using the inverse of the Hirschman-
Herfindahl (1945) index of the concentration of candidate vote shares, above the long run level of 2 
predicted by the 'Law' for single member plurality rule electoral systems, signals a departure from 
equilibrium and a decline in the degree of electoral competition. This runs contrary to the view, 
sometimes expressed in empirical studies of elections and public policy, that more candidates or 
parties, each with smaller vote shares reflects a more competitive environment. Consider, for example, 
the following recent quote that embraces this perspective while also touching upon other ways of 
thinking about competition:  
 
Electoral contestation may be defined as the degree of election-based competition in a political unit. 
Where contestation is minimal there is little organized opposition, and the incumbent party captures 
most of the votes and seats. Where contestation flourishes there are more competitors than available 
seats, a tight race for votes and seats, and frequent turnover in control. Contestation implies ex ante 
electoral uncertainty (Gerring,  Palmer, Teorell and Zarecki (2015: 574). 
 
The suggestion here that greater fragmentation of vote shares signals more competition is analogous 
to the conclusion usually reached about an industry when the concentration of output across firms 
declines. But an electoral system is not a private goods market. 1    
 
To fix ideas as we proceed, we illustrate the concepts and associated indexes of competitiveness 
discussed for the history of the Canadian parliamentary system. In doing so we find qualified support 
for the Duverger-Demsetz perspective on the measurement of electoral competitiveness. This support 
appears in the inverse co-movement uncovered between fragmentation and a new index of the 
contestability of elections, as we measure these dimensions of the Canadian electoral system using the 
history of regular national elections from the first election in 1867 to the forty-first election in 2011.  
 
Strictly speaking, our analysis of the conceptual issues and its empirical application to Canada applies 
only to a single member district, plurality rule (SMP) electoral system. However, the argument may 
also apply to winner take all systems that use forms of voting in which there is only one round, such 
as the alternative vote system. Towards the end of the paper we consider whether the argument can be 
applied to systems of proportional representation.   
 
We begin in section two of the paper by considering in some detail how increased fragmentation may 
be mistaken for a signal of greater competitiveness when competition is associated with electoral 
uncertainty and, as a practical matter, indexed by the closeness of electoral contests. This is followed 
in section three by development of the Duverger-Demsetz perspective on electoral competitiveness, in 
which party governance in an SMP system is interpreted as being analogous to the management of a 
natural monopoly. Section four presents evidence consistent with the Duverger-Demsetz view using 
data from the history of Canadian parliamentary elections. Here we consider how a new index of the 
contestability of elections relates to fragmentation of the electoral system. We show that as the effective 
                                                   
1 Empirical work that uses the effective number of parties (ENP) to measure competitiveness or a closely related index 
of party or vote fragmentation, such as 1 - 1/ENP or one minus the winner's vote share v1, includes: Ashworth; Geys, 
Heyndels and Wille (2014); Alfano and Baraldi (2015) - who use a normalized Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) index; 
Gerring et al (2015) - who use 1 - v1 which is practically similar to the HH index of party fragmentation (for Canada 
from 1867-2011, the correlation of 1 - v1 with ENP is about 0.89 and with Rae`s (1968) measure of fragmentation 1 - 
HH it is about 0.95). See also Ghosh (2010) for India, among others. We also note other work that associates party 
fragmentation with 'weak government' and increased public expenditure, a view that is complementary with, but 
distinct from the Duverger-Demsetz view that we shall develop in what follows. Examples of this literature include 
Roubini and Sachs (1989), Ricciuti (2004), Chhibber and Norrudin (2004), Borge (2005) and Geominne et al (2008).     
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number of parties rises above 2 and fragmentation increases, competitiveness as judged by our 
contestability index declines. Section five discusses the problems of extending the analysis to 
proportional systems, and section six concludes.   
 
Before continuing, it is important to note that our basic interest in what follows is not with an 
explanation of the effective number of parties or with the testing of Duverger's Law. We are interested 
in what is meant by political competition and how it can be measured. Competitiveness, as distinct 
from a given state of perfect or imperfect competition, is undoubtedly complex and difficult to study. 
In addition to (i) the entry and exit of candidates and parties and (ii) the rivalry between them in an 
election, political competition in an electoral system also includes (iii) competition among parties in 
the legislature between elections, (iv) competition among governments and bureaus, and (iv) 
relationships among these forces. In this paper we focus on particular aspects of the first and second 
dimensions of the process. 
 
 
2.   From the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market concentration to uncertainty and 
 closeness in elections   
 
A key aspect of economic competition that lies behind the often used Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) 
index of economic competitiveness (Hirschman 1945) concerns the ability of firms to affect market 
price. To the extent that individual firms are unable to influence market prices, the firm has no market 
power and the industry is said to be highly or perfectly competitive. This feature of a competitive 
market is usually translated into an index of competitiveness through the logic that if there are more 
firms, each of which supplies a smaller share of market demand, the ability of any individual firm to 
influence the market price will be reduced. The HH index is designed to encapsulate this logic and is 
defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in an industry. That is, 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗2𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 ,              (1) 
  
where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the output share of the ith of N firms in industry j.  The HH index will equal one if one 
firm supplies the entire market and will approach zero as the number of firms increase and each firm's 
market share declines. 
 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl measure of concentration has crossed over into political science as the 
effective number of candidates or parties (ENP), defined as one over an HH index constructed using 
candidate or party vote (or seat) shares (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). The national average ENP in 
election t with j = 1, 2, ..., J constituencies is defined as  
 
     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 / 𝐽𝐽   ,                              (2) 
 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 =  1/∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡2𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1   is the effective number of candidates at the constituency level and vijt  is 
the vote share of candidate i in constituency j in election t. Alternatively, we could employ the vote or 
seat shares of political parties at the national level to define a national party-based analogue to (2). In 
either case ENP will equal 2 if two candidates or parties equally share the vote and will rise as the 
number of candidates or parties increases and their individual vote shares decline.2  
 
A closely related measure of the fragmentation or fractionalization of the electorate was proposed by 
Rae (1968). His measure, Fragmentation, is defined as 1 - HH or, equivalently, 1 - 1/ENP, with ENP 
as in (2) above. At the constituency level, this index can be thought of as a measure of the probability 
                                                   
2 For extensive discussion of ENP see Taagepera (2007). Gaines and Taagepera (2013) consider some of the problems 
associated with the use of ENP to measure the number of parties.  
3 
 
that two randomly chosen individuals will not share the same partisan association. It approaches 1 as 
voters become more fractionalized.  
 
Both ENP and Fragmentation, defined as national averages over constituency level values based on 
vote shares, are shown in Figure 1 below for Canadian national elections 1 through 41 (1867 - 2011). 
(We shall ignore the middle line in the figure for now.) Both indexes indicate increasing fragmentation 
over the entire history, though Fragmentation appears to flatten out after the 25th election.3 Here and 
in subsequent figures, elections during world wars and the great depression (1917 - 1945) are shaded, 
and note is also made of the extraordinary 35th election in 1993 when the incumbent party in power 
(the Conservatives) lost (to the Liberals), falling from 169 seats out of 295 to just 2. 
 
 
 
                                                   
3  Many early Canadian elections featured acclamations, particularly in elections 1 (1867: 46/181), 2(1872:51/200), 
3(1874:54/206) and 13(1917:31/235). In these cases, we set v1 = 1 in a constituency with an acclamation in the case 
of ENP defined for constituencies. The presence of 2-seat constituencies (123 before the 28th election in 1968) makes 
little difference to the averages over all constituencies that form the basis for the measures discussed in this section. It 
is interesting to note in this respect, however, that for one-seat constituencies, the mean for all elections of the 
constituency level ENP = 2.4, while for the two-seat constituencies, mean ENP = 4.0.  We also note that there are 
10247 regular individual constituency elections in elections 1 through 41. The maximum number of candidates in any 
one constituency election from 1867 to 2011 (general elections 1 to 41) is 13. The maximum number of parties in any 
one election (taking self-named parties as a party without judgement of its success), independent candidates and 
candidates of unknown affiliation is 27, in the 19th election in 1940. On the development of the party system in Canada 
up to 1908, see recently Godbout and Hyland (2013).  
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To a considerable extent the use of the HH index in political science derives from the desire to test the 
predictions by Duverger (1954) about the effective number of candidates and parties that will arise in 
a long run electoral equilibrium.4 Duverger argues that in a single member district, plurality rule 
electoral system, the number of political parties at the district or constituency level tends towards 2 in 
the long run.5 Cox (1997, 271) interprets this as an upper bound on what he refers to as the carrying 
capacity of the electoral system. In a majoritarian parliamentary system, in Duverger's view, factions 
are forced together into two parties before the election by the winner take all aspect of the electoral 
system. This contrasts with the formation of coalition government after the election in a system of 
proportional representation. Cox (1997, 30) attributes the Law to elites  - opinion leaders, contributors, 
party officials, etc -  who do not want to waste their influence on hopeless candidates, and to strategic 
choices made by individual voters for the same reason, with uncertainty in the process introduced by 
the problems for elites and voters of coordinating to decide who is, and who is 
not, a serious candidate.  
 
It should be emphasized that Duverger’s Law is in the first instance a statement about two party 
competition at the district or constituency level. Even if the Law holds there, the two parties competing 
at the local level may differ across regions, thus leading to more than two at the center. (See for example 
Riker 1982, Gaines 1999, Chhibber and Kolman 2004 and Grofman et al 2009, in addition to Cox and 
Taagepera). To go from localized two-party competition to national competition between the same two 
parties requires additional assumptions. Despite this qualification however, Duverger's Law is far 
stronger than any result in economics concerning the number of firms in a competitive market 
equilibrium. In a perfectly competitive market, the number of firms is indeterminate. We shall return 
to the differences between indexes of fragmentation and competition defined at the constituency level 
and at the national level later. Here we wish to explain why it is tempting, though probably misleading, 
to use an HH-related index such as the average constituency value of ENP to measure the degree of 
electoral  competition.  
 
How could a rise in ENP or in Fragmentation be associated with increased electoral competitiveness 
despite the absence in elections of an analogue to a market price that can be manipulated by 
participants?6 One influential argument is that fragmentation of vote shares may serve as a proxy for 
political competitiveness when competition is associated with electoral uncertainty. The reasoning 
begins with the view that as a practical matter, electoral uncertainty can be metered by the closeness 
of elections in terms of candidate or party vote shares. Then, because greater fragmentation of the party 
system often leads to splitting of the vote among the contenders for office, it usually results in closer 
and thus more uncertain and competitive election contests.  
 
The idea that an election is competitive when its outcome is highly uncertain or 'too close to call'  is a 
sensible one that is widely employed. See, for example, Franklin (2004), Blais and Lago (2009) and 
Grofman and Selb (2009) as well as the earlier U.S. literature on 'vanishing marginals' originating with 
Mayhew (1974). Whether fragmentation of vote shares is a useful proxy for electoral uncertainty via 
its correlation with closeness of electoral outcomes is a separate empirical matter. In the remainder of 
this section, we consider how concentration of vote shares at the constituency level and indexes of 
closeness are actually related for the history of Canadian general elections. 7  
 
 
                                                   
4  Cox 1997 and Taagepera 2007 provide extensive discussions of Duverger's work and references to the associated 
literature. 
5 The Law is not a point prediction, but a statement that there cannot typically be more than 2 candidates (Cox, 1997, 
271). So in the long run there could be less than 2.   
6 See for example, Drazen and Eslava (2010), Aidt and Eterovic (2011), Aidt and Mooney (2015). 
7 There is perhaps some danger that we are setting up a 'straw person' in the rest of this section. However even if 
generalizing from the particular overstates our case, this exercise leads in interesting directions.   
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2.1  Electoral uncertainty as closeness in elections and its relationship to fragmentation 
 
One measure of the closeness of an election at the constituency or district level that appears in the 
literature is that proposed by Endersby, Galatas and Rackaway (2002).  Their index of the closeness of 
the election in constituency j in election t, CLjt(K), is  
   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾) =  𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 ∏ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1  ,                                                 (3) 
 
where 𝛱𝛱 denotes the product of terms following, vijt  is the vote-share of candidate i in jurisdiction j in 
election t, and K is taken by Endersby et. al. to be equal to the integer value of the effective number of 
parties in the constituency, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 .  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 0 if there is an acclamation (v1jt = 1) ; and it is = 1 if K 
candidates have equal vote shares.  
 
In our implementation of this index we set  K = 3 because, historically, the sum of the first three vote 
shares (in elections 1 to 41) constitutes on average 0. 97 of the vote and has never been less than 0.90 
of the vote with a small standard deviation of 0.026. As with ENP, this measure is aggregated up to 
the national level by averaging across constituencies.  
 
It is important to note that because CL is designed to measure closeness, it must differ from ENP to 
some extent. For example, ENP treats the outcome (.5, .5; ENP = 2) as inherently different than (.33, 
.33, .33; ENP = 3), while both cases can be said to be examples of equally close or highly competitive 
elections and are treated as such by the CL index. Even so, it may still be that ENP as a measure of 
fragmentation may serve as a rough proxy for closeness defined by (3).  
 
To see if that is so, Figure 1 above also provides the national average values of CL(K=3) for Canadian 
parliamentary elections running from Confederation in 1867 until the 41st election in 2011 along with 
the corresponding national averages over constituencies of ENP and Fragmentation. Inspection of that 
figure, together with the correlations provided in Table 1, makes it apparent that fragmentation may 
indeed serve as a proxy for this measure of closeness in the Canadian case, provided we ignore the 
dissimilarities across indexes of short run election to election fluctuations.8  
 
Table  1: Correlations 
 
 
 
                                                   
8 The downward trend in Closeness(3) after about the 30th election is not picked up by the fragmentation indexes,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 ENP ENP12party Fragmen- tation Closeness(3) V1 - V2 1 - v1 
(v1 - v2)/ 
volatility PS AMS 
ENP 1.00 0.88 0.98 0.91 0.02 0.87 -0.49 -0.40 -0.37 
ENP12party 0.88 1.00 0.82 0.76 0.25 0.65 -0.43 -0.30 -0.27 
Fragmen- 
tation 0.98 0.82 1.00 0.91 -0.11 0.92 -0.44 -0.39 -0.39 
Closeness(3) 0.91 0.76 0.91 1.00 0.18 0.73 -0.57 -0.56 -0.44 
V1 - V2 0.02 0.25 -0.11 0.18 1.00 -0.47 -0.27 -0.36 -0.18 
1 - V1 0.87 0.65 0.92 0.73 -0.47 1.00 -0.30 -0.18 -0.26 
(v1 - v2)/ 
volatility -0.49 -0.43 -0.44 -0.57 -0.27 -0.30 1.00 0.53 0.22 
PS  -0.40 -0.30 -0.39 -0.56 -0.36 -0.18 0.53 1.00 0.27 
AMS -0.37 -0.27 -0.39 -0.44 -0.18 -0.26 0.22 0.27 1.00 
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Definitions for Table 1:  
 
ENP   = ENP calculated over candidates at the constituency level using vote shares (maximum of 13  
   candidates in any one constituency).  
ENP12party     = ENP12party with ENP calculated at the national level using party vote shares for 12 parties - see  
   the Appendix for definition of parties. 
Fragmentation = 1 - HH = 1 - 1/ENP, where HH is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index defined using vote shares..  
 vi     = vote share of the candidate in the ith place. 
Closeness(3)  = an index of the closeness of  candidates' vote shares vi, assuming ENP = 3, as in Endersby, Galatas 
   and Rackaway (2002).  
(v1-v2)/volatility = the winner's vote margin v1 - v2  at the constituency level relative to historical volatility  for that  
   constituency.  
PS   = the Przeworski-Sprague (1971) volatility adjusted vote margin, defined by constituency and party. 
AMS  = an asymmetry adjusted measure of marginal seats, using an historical volatility and a 1 standard  
   deviation test to define when an incumbent's seat is safe.  
  
 
A second, somewhat more sophisticated measure of the closeness of elections turns out to be much 
less complementary to the use of fragmentation as a proxy. Following Mayhew (1974) and many 
others, this alternative measure of closeness embodies the idea that a close or competitive election is 
one in which the winning vote margin, (v1 -  v2), is 'small'. What small means in this context is not 
unambiguous. However, any attempt to define it must take into account the potential for voting patterns 
to change, since a relatively small margin can be quite 'safe' (a concept which will play a key role in 
measuring electoral contestability later on) if the party's vote in that riding varies little across elections, 
while even a large margin may be unsafe in a constituency with many voters that switch their vote 
from one election to the next.9  
 
Thus to reflect the relevant margin facing candidates, constituency vote margins must at least be 
adjusted for an estimate of the potential for voters to switch between parties from one election to the 
next. This point has been recognized for some time, highlighted in such works as Przeworski and 
Sprague (1971) whose index of closeness in elections is implemented immediately below, in Elkins 
(1974) who also discusses elections in Canada, and in Bartolini and Mair (1990), among others. It is 
important to note that the CL index is not adjusted for vote volatility, while in the Canadian case the 
adjustment matters significantly; the correlation of the average unadjusted margin, (v1 -  v2), with the 
volatility adjusted margin,  (v1 -  v2) / volatility,  over elections 1 through 41 (1867 - 2011) is - 0.27. 
(The calculation of volatility here is not without its own complications, and is discussed at length 
shortly.)  That is, the correlation is negative as well as low. Hence in the Canadian case, the simple 
vote margin, which is widely used as a measure of closeness in elections, is unreliable as a measure of 
volatility adjusted closeness. We suspect that this problem with the unadjusted vote margin arises in 
many other cases.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
The Przeworski and Sprague (1971) version of the volatility adjusted vote margin - hereafter, the PS 
index - is an especially interesting example of the class of measures of electoral uncertainty that 
incorporates vote volatility. As well as allowing for volatility, the PS index has embedded in it a 
specific view of the objectives of the losing candidates: namely that the primary objective of every 
candidate is to overcome his or her vote deficit vis a vis the incumbent. 
 
To construct the PS volatility adjusted vote margin index for Canada, the lagged vote deficit faced by  
                                                   
9 The idea of adjusting vote margins for volatility is analogous to standardizing scores by dividing the differences by 
a standard deviation. In the usual difference of means test, whether a difference is large or small is defined in terms 
of the normalized value of that difference in standard error units, with the standard error of the mean simply a 
specialized version of a standard deviation. In this way, any conclusion about the existence of a “meaningful” 
difference will reflect the level of uncertainty as to whether any observed difference might be due to chance alone.  
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each party or candidate p in constituency j at election time t, (𝑣𝑣1𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−2) is adjusted for the 
potential volatility of the vote to form the ratio ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 : 
 
      ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = (𝑣𝑣1𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1− 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1)𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗−1,𝑖𝑖   ,                                       (4) 
   
where volatility in the denominator is calculated across superconstituencies as  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 =
∑ �𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−2�
12
𝑝𝑝=1 /2 and where for the incumbent, p = 1 and h = 0. Note that the ex ante - ex post 
issue always faced when using actual election outcomes is explicitly dealt with in (4) by using a lag of 
one election in both numerator and denominator.  
 
Two particular issues that arise in calculating volatility in the denominator of (4) should be noted: (i) 
To allow for changes in constituency boundaries as constituencies are added and/or redrawn over time, 
it is necessary to derive vote and volatility measures for what we call superconstituencies. These are 
small aggregations of individual constituencies defined on an unchanging geographical basis. (We 
define 80 of these). We then assign to each party in each constituency in each election the average 
constituency level vote of that party in the superconstituency. This allows us to measure changes in 
votes across elections for each party, and thus to derive volatility measures despite the continual 
redistricting that has occurred over the decades; (ii) A second issue that must be faced is how to define 
political parties. We also require that a 'party' win at least one seat in at least two general elections to 
be considered as such; thus the data are defined for 11 political parties (see the Appendix) plus an 
Other or residual category. Exploration of the consequences of using other definitions are left for the 
future, as are the effect of using alternative definitions of the superconstituencies.10      
 
The following index for party p in constituency j is then calculated as: 
 
      𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �1 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 0 ≤ ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ≤ 11
ℎ𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗−1   𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 > 1    .                           (5) 
 
For a highly competitive party, c = 1 because the distance to go to become the winner is less than the  
floating vote or portion of the electorate that switched parties last time. Otherwise, the index is less 
than one and falling as the margin to be overcome by a party grows relative to volatility. 
 
Aggregating across all the parties in each constituency j using as weights the vote share of the party in  
the constituency gives: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 .𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝=1                                       (6) 
 
Cj = 0 indicates no competition in the constituency and, accordingly, for ridings where there was an 
acclamations we set Cj = 0. National average competitiveness across all constituencies for each 
election, the completed PS index, is then given by the national weighted average 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐽𝐽
𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1  𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ,                                                             (7) 
 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the adjusted (for acclamations) vote weight of each constituency in the national 
election.11   
                                                   
10 After 1945, the issue of how to define a party is not problematical if one sticks to analyzing the major parties in 
Parliament plus a residual. Earlier decades are a different matter. 
11 The adjusted vote weight attributes an average vote to constituencies where there was an acclamation, and then 
adjusts vote share weights of all constituencies accordingly.  
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Figure 2 below shows the PS index along with ENP and Fragmentation. Each of the indexes exhibits 
a concave shape before the outbreak of the first world war, likely reflecting an increasing degree of 
competition as the number of acclamations declined sharply after the 3rd election, and then a declining 
degree of competition as the party system developed. But both ENP and Fragmentation show upward 
trends over the remainder of electoral history, while the PS index remains more or less flat. This 
impression is confirmed by the correlations in Table 1: over elections 1 through 41, both indexes of 
fragmentation are negatively correlated with the PS index of volatility-adjusted vote margins at about 
- 0.4.  
 
 
 
For the Canadian case then, fragmentation does not serve as a good proxy for electoral competitiveness 
when it is measured with an index that is designed to reflect the average closeness of individual 
electoral contests, taking vote-volatility into account. We hypothesize that for single member district, 
plurality rule electoral systems, this conclusion holds more generally. 
 
 
3. The Duverger-Demsetz perspective on electoral competition 
 
There is a conceptual as well as an empirical basis for rejecting the view that rising fragmentation 
signals the greater competitiveness of elections. To develop this argument, we turn first to consider 
Demsetz's (1968) view of natural monopoly. The discussion here begins with the first theorem of 
welfare economics linking competition with economic efficiency before turning to Demsetz’s 
contribution and its applicability to Duverger’s Law and SMP elections. The implication of Demsetz’s 
contribution for party governance is operationalized via the notion of a contestable election, an idea 
1.6
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developed more fully in the economic context by Baumol (1982) and Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982). 
 
In any economic product market, social welfare is maximized when the difference between the total 
social benefit created by that product and the total social cost of producing that product is maximized.  
This, in turn, implies that production should be increased as long as the marginal social benefit exceeds 
its marginal social cost, and when the two are equalized, the market is conventionally described as 
being efficient.  When the product in question is a private good (i.e., a good that cannot be consumed 
simultaneously by more than one individual), two conditions are often invoked to ensure efficiency. 
First, the firms producing the good under increasing cost must be individually too small to influence 
the market selling price so that each firm becomes a price taker.  Under these circumstances the firm’s 
incentive to maximize profit means that each will produce where the market price equals its private 
marginal cost, and realize profits if the market price exceeds average cost. Second, there can be no 
barriers to new firm entry. This implies that firms will enter the market as long as profit can be made 
which in turn raises industry output, lowers the market price and reduces incumbent profit. In this way 
competition among established firms and potential entrants guarantees that only the lowest cost firms 
will survive and that all such firms will equate price to private marginal cost. It follows that if private 
and social costs are identical, competition among firms in the presence of these two conditions - price 
taking and the absence of barriers to entry - are sufficient for  market output to be efficient and for 
social welfare to be maximized. 
 
The sufficient conditions described above include two important caveats: first, that cost conditions 
allow atomistic firms to be the low cost option and, second, that the goods produced are not public 
goods that are nonrival in consumption.  In most industries, however, firm-level fixed costs are present. 
This means that firms are typically not atomistic in size and to the extent that time and space allow 
some degree of market segmentation, firms will retain some degree of market power and control over 
price in the short run.  To the extent that barriers to entry exist, such market power can persist over the 
longer run. In either case the ability to raise the selling price without losing all market share leads the 
profit maximizing firm to reduce its output and raise its price above marginal cost. The degree to which 
price diverges from marginal cost depends upon the degree of effective competition that arises from 
the firms’ rivals. All other things equal, the larger the market share held by any firm, the more market 
power it has and the less competitive will be that industry.  
 
Recognition that the conditions for perfect competition do not exist has led economists and policy 
makers to look for ways to assess how far any particular industry departs from perfect competition.  
Here the inability to observe directly either marginal social cost (as opposed to private average cost) 
or the level of economic (as opposed to accounting) profit has required the development of alternative 
measures to proxy the degree of competition. This has been done through observable market shares. 
Hence it is argued that in private markets, more firms with smaller market shares will have less market 
power which, in turn, will result in a smaller divergence between price and marginal cost. As noted 
earlier, the HH index is designed to reflect just such a tendency. 
 
While the use of the HH index has been important in areas such as competition policy, the second 
caveat to the sufficient conditions discussed above means that the competitive implications of this 
index will not apply in a market with public good characteristics. That is, unlike a market for private 
goods, net social value is not maximized by equalizing the market price for each consumer and the 
marginal cost of each producer. Rather social welfare is maximized when marginal social cost is 
equated to the sum of the (potentially different) marginal social benefits of each individual. Such 
markets - light from a lighthouse, knowledge generated by a new idea, a television program for 
communal viewing - are often described as being natural monopolies where concurrent consumption 
and cost minimization combine to imply a single producer. In such cases, competition among 
consumers and competition from incumbent producers and potential entrants cannot be relied upon to  
10 
 
induce efficiency.12  Because the absence of effective competition allows the monopolist to reduce 
output and raise price, many economists have advocated regulation. Hence in many communities 
public utilities are granted a monopoly right to produce in return for a commitment to satisfy market 
demand at regulated prices. The latter, in turn, are designed to allow the utility only normal profits. To  
the extent that the regulator can determine the appropriate set of market prices, greater efficiencies can 
be realized. 
 
In a provocative article entitled “Why regulate utilities?”, Demsetz (1968) argued that the fact that 
there can be only one efficient producer does not preclude competition from being used to improve 
upon the welfare generated within a natural monopoly. By the splitting of two usually conjoined rights, 
the right to own industry assets, and the right to determine the use of these assets, competition among 
potential managers over the dimensions of industry output and the prices at which output is marketed 
can be used to better approximate an efficient solution. That is, encouraging competition among 
potential managers over promised levels of industry output and the prices to be set can be used to 
achieve better market outcomes. In essence, the competitive process will end up revealing the insider 
information that would be needed by regulators to set the appropriate output and pricing terms. Market 
competition can in this way be refigured to meet the challenge of a single producer of a public good 
and to overcome the information problems facing public regulators. 
 
Suppose then that Duverger's Law is true and that 2 is the long run competitive equilibrium in an SMP 
system such as Canada’s. The interpretation of Duverger's Law as a long run competitive equilibrium 
fits easily into Demsetz's (1968) re-interpretation of competitive equilibrium in economic markets 
served by a natural monopolist. That is, because governance of the political process has the 
characteristic of a public good - the policies and programs instituted by the governing party are 
consumed by all constituents concurrently - the governing party can be seen as analogous to the 
manager of a public utility. Because providing governance in a collective has the same cost structure 
as a natural monopoly - a single governing party/management team is the low cost service provider - 
social benefit is maximized when there is only one manager or governance provider. To avoid the 
reduction in service and higher cost that comes from the incentives facing the monopoly provider, 
competition must exist over the right to provide that service. This competition is provided through free 
and fair elections. However, for such competition to enhance welfare, there must exist not only 
competing sets of promised policy alternatives, but also a credible alternative manager that can step in 
and perform should the promised level of performance be reneged upon or not offered.  
 
In this view, contestability in the sense developed by Demsetz and by Baumol and his co-authors - 
understood as the ability to credibly replace the incumbent producer - is the key mechanism by which 
the benefits of competition can be realized effectively by the community. In the political arena, 
competition in an election arises through the set of policies that competing parties view as better 
reflecting the wishes of the electorate.  However the public good characteristic of governance means 
that effective competition comes not from the combined set of policy alternatives on offer, but from 
the set that can be provided by the credible alternative which must include the likelihood that that 
particular policy set will be implemented. Here the instability of minor parties in SMP systems 
highlighted by Duverger becomes critical. The incentive not to waste one’s vote by supporting a 
nonviable alternative implies that the greater is the degree of party fragmentation, the less effective 
will second or third placed parties be as a constraint on the performance of the governing party. 
Because greater fragmentation means that each of the opposition parties is less likely to win a majority 
                                                   
12 If concurrent consumers cannot be excluded from consuming, competition among consumers for the lowest (zero) 
price will result in insufficient revenue being generated to support the efficient level of production.  On the other hand, 
if concurrent consumers can be excluded, efficiency could be achieved by a producer setting the Lindahl (individual) 
prices needed to realize a level of output at which the sum of the individual marginal values equals marginal social 
cost.  However in the absence of competing alternatives, the sole producer will exploit its market power, raise the set 
of Lindahl prices and under produce relative to the potentially efficient level. 
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of seats, and since coalitions are difficult to arrange and maintain over time in SMP systems, each of 
these parties becomes less credible as a threat to the incumbent government. In such a fragmented party 
system, the pressure on the governing party to make and keep election promises is thus diminished. In 
short, from the Duverger- Demsetz perspective, a rise in ENP above 2 signals a decline in effective 
electoral competitiveness.13   
 
In the next section, we attempt to apply the Duverger-Demsetz view to Canada by measuring the  
contestability of elections. But before we do so, it is interesting to consider how the idea of 
competitiveness as electoral uncertainty fits with this approach. Is a contestable election also highly 
uncertain? If we are concerned with the consequences of competition, uncertainty in itself is not a 
necessary ingredient. That is, in the absence of performance differences across contenting parties, 
contestability will restrain the options of the incumbent such that replacement would arise only when 
the incumbent party behaves 'badly' or miscalculates the nature and distribution of voter preferences. 
On the other hand, if a candidate or party is superior in terms of performance, we may observe long 
periods of one-party dominance even in a highly contestable system, a point also made by Buchler 
(2014). Thus in a framework in which contestability is the center of attention, one party dominance 
and the absence of electoral uncertainty are not reliable indicators of a lack of competition.14  
 
 
4.   Analyzing the Canadian electoral system from the Duverger-Demsetz perspective 
 
From the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, what matters for competitiveness is whether or not the 
governing party faces the threat of replacement by an alternative when it doesn't provide what voters 
wish. The key requirement is that the threat of replacement must be real, which requires the alternative 
to be credible. When the incumbent can be replaced easily by a credible alternative we may say that 
the electoral system is highly contestable. In this section we provide some empirical support for the 
Duverger-Demsetz perspective using the history of the Canadian parliamentary system to measure the 
contestability of elections at the national level. We show that contestability has tended to be greater 
when the vote is less fragmented.   
 
As is well known, a good electoral strategy in a Westminster system like Canada`s is to target marginal 
constituencies: districts especially susceptible to changing hands in an election (see, for example, 
Hartle 1985, and Persson and Tabellini 2000 chapter 8, among others). This suggests that the 
proportion of marginal constituencies would be a good indicator of the contestability of an election. If 
every constituency is perfectly safe for its incumbent regardless of what the challenger may do, there 
is no competition and the position of the incumbent party in power in Ottawa is clearly not contestable. 
On the other hand, if every seat is marginal, ‘every seat is a battleground’, as Bodet (2014) puts it.  
 
Marginal seats as a measure contestability can be improved upon by incorporating a measure of the 
asymmetry of safe seats among parties, on the grounds that a party holding relatively more of the safe 
seats has an important advantage over its opposition. This is because it is able to focus its resources on 
                                                   
13 There is an additional, conceptually distinct source of inefficiency that may worsen with fragmentation. This stems 
from the possibility that as the number of parties increases, each party is forced by the division of the electorate to 
focus its electoral promises on a narrower segment of the electorate, thus moving the public sector towards special 
interest politics and away from concerns over the provision of general public services. See Lizzeri and Persico (2005) 
for an interesting exploration of this view. Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) propose and positively test a similar 
hypothesis for Indian states. deMesquita, Morrow and Siverson (2001) present essentially the same view. See also the 
additional literature cited in the first footnote concerning the weak government hypothesis. A reasonable conjecture 
is that this source of inefficiency may be a problem in all SMP systems with weak national parties.  
14 We use the word 'reliable' here because we are aware that the matter is not straightforward. If the survival of the 
incumbent was always assured (i.e., absolutely certain), there is no political competition. Even if the incumbent is 
superior, preservation of competition as a principle of governance may require throwing out such an incumbent from 
time to time, thus introducing uncertainty into the process..  
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constituencies that are thought to be marginal to a greater extent than its opposition. In what follows, 
we construct an asymmetry adjusted marginal seat index and then consider how it is related to 
fragmentation.    
 
To operationalize the idea that the contestability of an election depends on the asymmetry adjusted 
proportion of marginal seats in an election, we must first define what marginal means. Hartle (1985) 
suggests that a marginal constituency is one from which economic rents cannot be taken and 
redistributed to other places without serious risk of electoral defeat. This is attractive as a definition of 
electoral marginality, but impossible to apply without the ability to measure the distribution of rents 
across constituencies, data which are as yet unavailable. 
 
Previous work in Canada on marginal or safe seats includes Lovinck (1973) and most recently Bodet 
(2014). Both of these interesting studies use data for small samples of Canada’s electoral history. Bodet 
defines a safe seat as essentially one that lies in the upper tail of the distribution of vote margins and 
uses a one standard deviation above the mean based on the distribution of vote margins in the previous 
election (and some ancillary criteria) as his cutoff. Winning margins larger than that cutoff are 
considered sufficiently large to provide a substantial cushion of safeness to the incumbent party in that 
constituency. We also employ the one standard deviation standard in this initial exploration. 
 
To measure a safe, or alternatively, marginal seat by party, we consider the volatility adjusted, winning  
vote margin for the candidate of each incumbent party p (which won at time t-1) in constituency j 
within superconstituency s in election t, defined as 
 
      𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼1𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = (𝑣𝑣1𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗−1− 𝑣𝑣2𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗−1)𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗−1  .                                                                    (8) 
 
If this IPmargin falls in the upper tail of the distribution of all such margins for all parties for the 
previous three elections - e.g., it is more than one standard deviation above the mean - the constituency 
is judged to be safe for that party. Incumbent margins for the next election are constructed in the same 
way by adding the next election outcome and dropping the oldest to form the relevant test distribution. 
Note that only past election outcomes are used to judge safeness, except when a constituency does not 
have an incumbent (for any reason) in which case it is considered to be marginal or not safe. Once 
again the superconstituency, defined over an unchanging geographical area, is an important feature of 
this construction via the measurement of volatility. This is because the distributions of IPmargins 
require measures from four consecutive elections, a long period of time within which many 
constituencies are born, die and change boundaries.  
 
This algorithm, applied to all constituencies in each election, leads to the number of seats that are 
considered to be safe in each election, 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡. We then compute the proportion of marginal seats (in the 
total to be elected) in each election, MSt,  
        𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  1 −  𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 ,                           (9) 
 
as a measure of the competitiveness of the election as a whole. In this case, MS = 1 indicates that 100%  
of the seats in Parliament are marginal.  
 
As noted earlier, the proportion of marginal or safe seats does not in itself provide a good index of 
contestability. How safe seats are distributed across parties, and in particular, whether or not there is 
an asymmetry in their distribution, also matter. Regardless of the number of marginal seats in total, an  
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equal distribution of safe seats across the major parties will result in a highly contestable election 
compared to a situation in which the same number of safe seats are held predominately by just one 
party. To acknowledge the importance of the distribution of safe seats to a judgment about the 
contestability of an election, we adjust the proportion of marginal seats MSt by the degree of asymmetry 
in safe seats among the parties to produce a better measure of competitiveness at the national level.  
 
To capture the notion of asymmetry, we borrow an idea used by Gaines and Taagepera (2013) in a 
somewhat different context to define the Euclidean deviation from a three party equal sharing of safe 
seats:  
    𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡 =   �3/2  ∗ �(1/3 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝1𝑡𝑡)2 + (1/3 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝2𝑡𝑡)2 + (1/3 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝3𝑡𝑡)2                                             (10) 
 
where Spkt = the seat shares in Parliament of the party in kth place in terms of seats. Then 𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡= 0 if the 
safe seats are symmetrically distributed; and 𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡= 1 if one party has all the safe seats. In Canada’s 
case the third 'party' is a residual consisting of all other parties except the two major parties in Canada, 
the Liberals and Conservatives (which are broadly defined as part of our 12 party aggregation).  
 
An asymmetry index based on the proportion of marginal seats that acknowledges the asymmetry in 
their distribution may then be defined as: 
 
       MSadjt =  𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ∗  (1 −  𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡).                                          (11) 
         
MSadjt  (the proportion of marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry) = MSt if safe seats are symmetrically 
distributed among the parties, and is 0 if one party has all the safe seats.  
 
There is one further adjustment to make before the contestability index is finished. The formulation in 
(11) may overweigh asymmetry. For example, if there are only 3 safe seats in 300 held by only 1 party, 
MSadj = 0. To correct this problem, we first adjust safe seats for asymmetry in their distribution: 
    𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  =  {𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡} .              
 
AS = 0 if safe seats are symmetrically distributed and AS = 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 (the proportion of safe seats) if one 
party has all the safe seats. We then use  𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 to define an adjusted asymmetry index of marginal seats: 
  𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  = 1 −  {𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙3𝑡𝑡} .                                   (12) 
 
This is our metric of electoral contestability. AMS = 1 if all safe seats are symmetrically distributed, 
and AMS =  1 −  𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡  (the proportion of marginal seats) if one party has all the safe seats.  
 
In Figure 3 we show the AMS index for Canada in comparison to the corresponding symmetry 
unadjusted series MS. It can be seen that in seven or eight elections with a relatively small number of 
marginal seats, the asymmetry adjusted index is much higher than the unadjusted one. This pattern 
indicates that in these elections there is an important degree of symmetry in the distribution of safe 
seats even though their absolute number may be small, and illustrates the necessity of integrating the 
symmetry of the distribution of safe seats into the index of electoral contestability (12). 
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4.1  Fragmentation and contestability in the history of Canadian general elections 
We can now consider the relationship between fragmentation and our measure of electoral 
contestability in a manner that sheds light on the Duverger-Demsetz perspective. To do so, it is 
instructive to begin by looking at a scatter diagram that relates both the AMS and PS indexes to the 
ENP Ratio  = 2/ENP, with ENP define defined as a national average over constituency level values 
based on vote shares of candidates. This will be followed by regressions that confirm what a visual 
inspection of the data appears to indicate.  
Using ENP in the form of a ratio is convenient transformation because in the Duverger-Demsetz view, 
the ENP Ratio will equal 1 in the long run of an electoral system that is highly contestable and will 
decline as the number of parties increases above 2. Recall that it is also the case that the AMS and PS 
indexes take a value of 1 when reflecting the highest degree of competitiveness and decline in value as 
competitiveness decreases. It follows that if increases in each of these indexes measure greater 
competiveness, all three measures should be positively related. 
As the regression lines on the scatter diagram of Figure 4 suggest, the ENP Ratio is positively related 
to both competitive measures, implying that fragmentation has a negative association with 
competitiveness. In the upper portion of the figure it can be see that as ENP Ratio rises towards 1, so 
does contestability as indicated by a rise in the values of the asymmetry adjusted marginal seat index 
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AMS. Here, then, is qualified support for the Duverger-Demsetz view. We say 'qualified support' 
because of the potential sensitivity of our conclusion to alternative assumptions that could be made in 
the construction of our index that have yet to be explored.  
We can also see in the figure that the PS index of volatility adjusted vote margins is also positively 
related to the ENP Ratio, indicating that fragmentation and our preferred measure of competitiveness 
as closeness are negatively related. This is further evidence that in the Canadian case at least, 
fragmentation is not positively correlated with competitiveness.  
Closer inspection of Figure 4 indicates that there are some episodes in which observations tend to 
cluster off of the regression lines. These clusters suggest controlling factors that can be used in 
regressions to remove anomalies that distract from the underlying relationships. Two groupings of 
elections are of interest in this respect: first, elections during the world wars, which likely saw the 
introduction of elements that would not be present under normal circumstances; and, second, elections 
in the period before 1900 when the party system in Canada was maturing.  
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The relationship between fragmentation, represented by the ENP Ratio, and the competitiveness 
indexes AMS and PS, as well as the role of the dummy variables for war and the early years of the 
party system, are explored in the regressions presented in Table 2 on the following page. 
The general appearance of positive, significant coefficients on the AMS and PS indexes across the first 
three columns representing different versions of the equation for 2/ENP confirm what visual inspection 
of the scatter diagram in Figure 4 suggests, namely that more fragmentation is associated with less 
contestability (see the coefficient on AMS), and less competition defined as closeness (and uncertainty) 
of electoral contests.  
 
By using the ENP Ratio as the dependent variable in Table 2, we do not mean to imply that the 
equations in the table represent a causal relationship running from the AMS or PS indexes to ENP.  
Rather the regression equations represent a long run equilibrium relationship in which the number of 
parties, their vote shares and degree of competitiveness are all simultaneously determined. 
Accordingly, the dynamic least squares (DOLS) estimation in columns four and five of the table treat 
the model tabulated as a cointegrating relation, and allow for the possibility that standard errors of the 
OLS regressions may be biased by correlations across time arising among the three variables ENP, 
AMS and PS.15 
 
Consider the DOLS results in the fourth or second to last column in Table 2. The stationarity of the 
residuals of this model and the fact that the coefficient estimates on AMS and PS retain their sign and 
significance compared to the OLS results further supports the view that contestability as well as 
electoral uncertainty are on average both negatively related to party fragmentation over the history of 
parliamentary elections in Canada. 
 
Before turning to consider the extension of our ideas to proportional representation systems, it is useful 
to consider how the statistical relationship between fragmentation and contestability carries over to a 
situation in which fragmentation is measured at the national party level, as indicated by ENP measured 
using vote shares of (12) parties at the national level, labeled ENP12party in Tables 1 and 4. As Table 
1 shows, in Canada this measure of the effective number of parties is highly correlated with ENP 
defined over candidates at the constituency level, at 0.88, and is generally larger that the constituency  
based ENP.16 
 
We expect that a high degree of contestability at the national level will put pressure on third and fourth 
place parties in the constituencies. In extreme cases, it is conceivable that one party will dominate in a 
particular region, and another party in another, with contestability remaining high at the center where 
there are then two (or even more) major opposing parties, each of which has many candidates that are 
'safe' in their own region of dominance. While our measure of contestability - the AMS index - can 
handle such situations, ENP defined as an average over constituencies may not. In the example 
outlined, average fragmentation at the constituency level will be low, while at the national level it 
remains more robust. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
15 It does this by adding leads and lags of all three variables into the equation, so that, in principle, the calculated 
residuals are orthogonal to the entire process despite the mutual interdependence of the three variables. 
16 In Canada from 1867 to about the start of the first world war, the number of parties as reflected by ENP12party 
declined steadily to about 2 at the outbreak of the war. Thereafter, both ENP12party and ENP defined as an average 
over the constituencies began to rise, with ENP12party being uniformly higher than ENP.  Since Duverger's Law is a 
long run result, it is not clear whether or not either enp index is systematically greater than 2 in the long run. 
Investigation of that issue requires a dynamic empirical model of enp, which to our knowledge has not yet been 
constructed for Canada or elsewhere..  
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Table2 
The Relationship Between the ENP Ratios and Competitiveness Indexes 
                                     
                 ENP Ratio                      ENP12party Ratio 
           __________________________________         _______________ 
 OLS OLS OLS DOLS 
(long 
run) 
 DOLS 
(long run) 
   
AMS 0.71***     
(2.91) 
0.47** 
(2.04) 
0.46** 
(1.92) 
1.41*** 
(3.09) 
 1.54** 
(2.43) 
   
PS  0.64*** 
(3.07) 
0.55* 
(1.78) 
0.83* 
(1.77) 
 0.78 
(1.20) 
   
ww1 0.31*** 
(3.05) 
0.37***    
(4.03) 
0.37*** 
(3.91) 
0.20** 
(2.20) 
 
 -.0001 
(0.001) 
   
ww2 -0.10 
(1.38) 
-0.06     
(0.85) 
-0.06 
(0.80) 
      
party_             
formation 
  0.03 
(0.40) 
      
constant 0.20 0.29 0.32 -0.58  -0.82    
R2 (adjusted) 0.31 0.44 0.43 0.75  0.64    
Prob (F-statistic) 0.001 0.000 0.000       
n 38 38 38 31  31    
ADF 
(MacKinnon 1996,   
tau test) 
  -4.31* 
(SIC; 
constant 
& trend) 
-6.56*** 
(SIC; 
no 
constant, 
no trend) 
 -2.79 
(SIC; 
no constant, 
no trend.). 
-7.52*** 
(with const. 
& trend) 
   
*(**)*** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1 % respectively. Absolute value of t-statistic in brackets. 
 
Notes to Table 2:  
1. Dependent variables: ENP Ratio = 2/ENP with ENP calculated at the constituency level, OR  ENP12party Ratio = 
2/ENP12party with ENP calculated at the national level using party vote shares for 12 parties - see the Appendix for 
the definition of parties.  
2. AMS = the asymmetry adjusted marginal seat index of electoral contestability; PS = the Przeworski-Sprague index 
of electoral competition as closeness or electoral uncertainty; ww1 (ww2) = dummy variable equal to 1 if an election 
was held during world war one (two), 0 otherwise; party_formation = dummy variable equal to 1 if the election is in 
1900 or before, 0 otherwise.   
3. OLS = ordinary least squares; DOLS = dynamic least squares, maximum 3 lags and leads, 3 selected; AIC 
criterion. Only the long run DOLS equation is shown. All estimation using other default options in Eviews 9. 
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To allow for such situations, we also include the fifth column in Table 2, where the left side variable 
is now ENP12party Ratio, which is 2 divided by ENP defined at the national level using vote shares 
of 12 parties that have existed over Canadian parliamentary history.17  Despite the complications of 
going from the constituency to the national level, we see that the statistically significant inverse 
relationship between fragmentation and the contestability index AMS still remains in the DOLS 
estimates, though not with quite the same statistical strength. The PS index of closeness or electoral 
uncertainty at the constituency level is now insignificant, perhaps reflecting situations in which 
contestability remains at the national level even though there are parties that have carved out for 
themselves safe seats that are regionally concentrated 
 
 
5.  Does the Duverger-Demsetz perspective extend to proportional systems?   
 
To complete our analysis of electoral competition from the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, we 
consider whether our ideas about the importance and role of contestability in SMP electoral systems 
can be extended to proportional representation in multi seat elections (PR)? Here we are of two minds.   
 
On the one hand, if there is a single party in government, the exact argument given earlier for why two 
parties produce a highly contestable electoral system in the plurality setting will also apply to the PR 
setting. As we have argued earlier, the greater is the degree of party fragmentation, the less effective 
will be the second or third placed parties as a constraint on the performance of the governing party. 
Moreover, the work that has been done on extensions of Duverger’s Law for proportional 
representation systems is based on the argument that the carrying capacity of a PR system (defined in 
terms of ENP at the district level) will be a function of the district magnitude, M, in that system, i.e., 
the number of seats being contested in a given district (or the size of median district overall). The 
carrying capacity of the system is either expected to have an upper bound of M + 1 (Cox, 1997) and 
will thus be above 2 for M > 1, or expected to be, on average, the square root of M + 1 (Taagepera and 
Shugart, 1989), which is above 2 for M > 4.  Because values of M > 1 mean that, for PR systems, we 
expect to see more than 2 winning parties, this means that the likelihood of there being a single party 
majority tends to diminish with M (Rae, 1967).   
 
Since coalitions are likely to emerge in PR systems and because coalitions are difficult to arrange and 
maintain, there will sometimes be minority governments. It may therefore appear to be the case that a 
PR system is more contestable since it is easier to displace a minority government. However, the 
opposition is also likely to be fragmented under PR for the same reasons, regardless of whether there 
is a minority or a majority in government, and the opposition coalition, if there is one, will also tend to 
be difficult to maintain over time. Hence, a rise in ENP above 2 can also signal a decline in effective 
electoral competitiveness in a PR system.  
 
From the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, the 'best' situation would be one where there is a strong 
coalition in government to provide public services, and a strong coalition in opposition threatening to 
replace it, the same situation that leads to a high degree of contestability (and efficiency) in an SMP 
system. In general, then, fragmentation of the party system under PR is not conducive to contestability 
because of the costs of forming and maintaining party coalitions, and the best outcome under PR 
mimics that for the SMP system. Hence we arrive at essentially the same assessment as for SMP, 
though by a different route 18     
                                                   
17 Again, see the Appendix for the definition of party used here.  
18 There is an additional, conceptually distinct source of inefficiency that may worsen with fragmentation under PR. 
This stems from the possibility that each party in a PR system focuses its electoral promises on a narrower segment 
of the electorate than does a party under SMP. If so, the public sector under PR will be driven more by the demands 
of special interests and pay less attention to the provision of public services, compared to an SMP system which 
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On the other hand, if we approach competition in terms of the measures used by Blais and Lago (2009) 
or Grofman and Selb (2009), we can think of competition increasing with M, because the threshold of 
exclusion - the largest vote share that a party can achieve and still be denied even a single seat - declines 
with M for all PR electoral rules. Thus entry of new parties is generally easier under PR than in an 
SMP system, and entry is another important dimension of competitiveness. Moreover, while the check 
on the behavior of the governing party generated by a truly viable single competitor, emphasized as 
the root of electoral contestability in a plurality system, does not apply in the PR context, what may 
apply is a growing multiplicity of viable alternatives to the present governing coalition that include 
some but not all elements of that coalition joined to other parties not in the present coalition.  
 
By throwing up what is likely to be a wider range of alternatives, a fact that is sometimes taken to be 
a major failing of PR systems, namely the relative fragility of multiparty coalitions in terms of 
durability, may be given a positive interpretation from the economic perspective we have offered in 
this paper.  To put this another way, we may say that the analysis of PR and, by implication, of SMP 
is not complete without considering the entry dimension of electoral competition, a dimension that is 
not identical to contestability.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions and suggestions for further work  
 
We have considered a number of distinctive ways to think about electoral competition in SMP systems, 
focusing on the issue of whether fragmentation or concentration of the electoral landscape in terms of 
vote shares, electoral uncertainty as measured by the closeness of contests, and the overall 
contestability of elections as indexed by asymmetry between major parties in the number of marginal 
seats stand as equivalent or even complementary indicators of greater electoral competition. The 
Duverger-Demsetz perspective, which emphasizes the contestability of elections, suggests these are 
not equivalents.  
 
For SMP systems in particular, logic suggests that contestability will diminish with party fragmentation 
- in other words, that an increase in the effective number of parties (or in other related measures of 
fragmentation) is associated with reduced electoral competition. Evidence that this view has merit was 
provided by showing that the effective number of parties and a new index of electoral contestability - 
the asymmetry adjusted index of marginal constituencies - are inversely related for the history of the 
Canadian parliamentary system. Robustness of the empirical work to alternative assumptions, for 
example about the exact way to formulate expectations of electoral success using ex post electoral data 
and the standards used to measure the safeness of seats, remains to be studied. 
 
In looking to future research, there is the challenge of setting the Duverger-Demsetz perspective (or 
any other perspective on electoral competition) in a wider context in which various dimensions of 
electoral competition, including competition in legislatures between elections, are all considered 
together. The theory and measurement of electoral contestability in PR systems, considered only 
briefly here, also remains to be explored. 
 
                                                   
effectively blocks some interests that are not regionally concentrated. (For example, the Greens in Canada may have 
5% of the vote in every constituency, but they elect only one member of parliament from a place known for voters 
who have a strong taste for the environment). On the other hand, some argue that candidates who must appeal to voters 
within a small geographic area and who can differentiate themselves from their competitors by making promises for 
narrowly targeted pork barrel items are more likely to arise in a SMP system than in a PR system (Shugart and Carey, 
1995; Persson and Tabellini 2002, 2005). We cannot resolve this debate over the role of electoral systems in the link 
between fragmentation, special interests and inefficiency here. 
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Appendix: 
The data, definition of variables, and measuring vote volatility using superconstituencies 
 
1.  Data 
 
Data on votes by constituency, by candidate and by party for regular parliamentary general elections 
1 - 41 were collected for each election from series supplied by Elections Canada.  This data is 
available online through the Parliament of Canada website at: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/FederalRidingsHistory/HFER.asp 
 
The 12 party classification employed throughout the paper is based on three criteria: A party exists as 
such if it gained at least 4% of the popular vote in at least one election and contested at least 1% of the 
seats in at least one election  - there are 23 parties satisfying these two criteria - plus it must have won 
at least 1 seat in at least two elections. There are 11 parties satisfying all these criteria over the history 
of the modern state: Liberal, Conservative, Labour, the National Party, the Bloc Quebecois, Social 
Credit, Reform-Alliance, the CCF_NDP, Raillement Creditiste, the Progressives, and the United 
Farmers of Alberta, with a residual category denoted as 'Other'. Liberal and Conservative include small 
groups that voted with the major party at various times as is the usual custom.  
 
2.  Variables 
 
ENP   = ENP calculated over candidates at the constituency level using candidate vote shares (max. 13  
   candidates in any one constituency).  
ENP12party = ENP calculated over 12 parties (11 plus Other) at the national level using party vote shares. 
ENP Ratio, ENP12party Ratio = 2 divided by the corresponding ENP number. 
Fragmentation  = 1 - HH = 1 - 1/ENP, where HH is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index defined using vote shares.  
 vi     = vote share of the candidate in the ith place. 
Closeness(3)   = an index of the closeness of  candidates' vote shares vi, assuming ENP = 3, as in Endersby,  
   Galatas and Rackaway (2002).  
(v1-v2) / volatility   = the winner's vote margin v1 - v2  at the constituency level relative to historical volatility for that    
            constituency.  
PS vol-adj. margins = the Przeworski-Sprague (1971) volatility adjusted vote margins by constituency by party. 
AMS_1std   = an asymmetry adjusted measure of marginal seats, using an historical volatility and a 1 standard 
       deviation test to define when an incumbent's seat is safe.  
ww1    = 1 for election number 13 (1917); 0 otherwise. 
ww2   = 1 for election numbers 19 and 20 (1940 and 1945); otherwise 0. 
party_formation  = 1 for elections between 1 and 9 (1867 until 1900); 0 otherwise. 
 
 
3.  Volatility 
Adjusting vote margins for volatility is not easy to do over long periods of time because of redistricting. 
For a country like Canada that has had consistent growth in the number and frequent changes in the 
size of individual constituencies, new ridings appear in many elections. Without a past, a constituency 
can have no history of vote variability and cannot be included in the construction of a volatility adjusted 
vote margin. To circumvent the loss of information on winning margins through growth and 
redistricting, we construct a large number of regional super-constituencies - 80 in total - based on 
geographic regions that persist throughout Canada’s election history and that can be used to establish 
small area vote volatility in the period when a new constituency is created or an old one is reshaped. 
The number and name of individual constituencies in a superconstituency may change over time, but 
its geographical boundaries remain fixed. To give one example, the area around Ottawa was used as 
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the base for one of Ontario’s 29 superconstituencies. Electorally it consisted of 1 riding in 1867 and 
rose to include 7 ridings by 2011.19 
 
Aggregate volatility is then computed as follows: Average vote shares by party over constituencies 
within a superconstituency for each election are computed. For each superconstituency in each 
election, the absolute value of the changes in these (party-specific) average vote shares across adjacent 
elections is computed, summed and divided by 2. Each of these superconstituency specific differences 
in vote shares is then weighted by the relative number of constituencies inside each superconstituency, 
and summed to derive an aggregate volatility number for each election.  
 
Volatility so computed is shown in Figure A1 for the 2nd to 41st election (1869 - 2011) in Canada. 
The peaks in the 14th and 35th elections are noticeable. Whether there is a trend in volatility or not is 
difficult to determine.  
 
                                                   
19  Note that the use of one past period to construct our volatility measure means that the index can begin only in the 
second election. This also implies the unavoidable loss of some information when new provinces are added to the 
country, such as Newfoundland’s entry into Canada in 1949.  
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